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Are Police People Too? 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 
ACT’S “PRIVATE PERSON” STANDARD AS IT APPLIES 
TO FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the administration of criminal justice 
historically resided with the various states,1 the scope of federal 
law enforcement has grown immensely over the years.2 Today, 
there are numerous federal investigative and law enforcement 
agencies that are assigned significant duties and 
responsibilities for the protection of the public.3 Unfortunately, 
citizens are occasionally harmed by law enforcement officers in 
the process of carrying out these duties.4 The law provides both 
criminal and civil remedies to compensate citizens for these 
harms, and, at the same time, provides a deterrent to 
undesirable conduct.5 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)6 is 
one such remedy. The Act provides a means of obtaining 
compensation for harms caused by the negligent actions of 
federal employees and for certain intentional torts.7 The FTCA 
is necessary because the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
  
 1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 109 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson 
ed., 1868) (“There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State 
Governments, . . . the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. . . . [The 
administration of justice] being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property 
. . . [has] its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 2 H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936). 
 3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (2006) (granting powers to agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2009) (detailing general functions of the FBI). 
 4 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Border Patrol Is Criticized as Abusive, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 21, 1998, at A14; Frank York, Doctor Seeks Justice After DEA’s Clinical Assault, 
WORLDNETDAILY (Feb. 21, 2000, 1:00 AM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=4047. 
 5 See United States v. Westmoreland, 982 F. Supp. 376, 378 (S.D. W. Va. 
1997) (discussing the exclusionary rule in the criminal context and pointing out the 
availability of civil remedies). 
 6  28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2680 (2006). 
 7 See id. The federal government retains its immunity for certain intentional 
torts, if they are committed by a federal employee who is not a law enforcement officer. 
See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
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shields the government from suit without its consent, and 
because the judicially created cause of action against individual 
officers has significant shortcomings, namely that those 
individuals may be judgment-proof.8 
Because the FTCA was designed to address all tort 
actions brought against the United States,9 it is ill-suited to 
address the unique concerns that arise when the actions of law 
enforcement officers are the subject of a suit. The primary 
problem with the FTCA in these cases stems from its 
requirement that the United States be liable “in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual.”10 This 
private person standard is inappropriate because, in their 
mission to uphold the law, these officers are obligated to put 
themselves in situations that ordinary citizens are not.11  
Recognizing this issue, courts in the past employed 
different analyses to reach what seemed to be just results in 
cases involving law enforcement.12 However, in recent years, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson,13 which 
advocated a strict interpretation of the wording of the FTCA,14 
has eliminated the flexibility that lower courts have used in 
applying this statute. Since the FTCA is not well tailored to 
these types of cases, and the Supreme Court has mandated a 
plain meaning interpretation, courts have struggled to find 
new approaches to the FTCA that follow the holding in Olson 
while both allowing law enforcement agencies enough 
discretion to carry out their duties and recognizing that these 
officers are not similarly situated to private citizens. To date 
they have not been successful. This note argues that the only 
viable solution is for Congress to modify the FTCA by adding 
language providing that, in suits concerning the actions of law 
enforcement officers, the United States is liable in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a state or municipality 
under like circumstances.  
  
 8 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 
2790. In today’s world of indemnification, however, this shortcoming is debatable. See 
infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. 
 10 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 See Hetzel v. United States, 43 F.3d 1500, 1505 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Crider v. 
United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989); Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 
823 (9th Cir. 1985); Tomcsik v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1989), 
aff’d, 917 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 13 546 U.S. 43 (2005). 
 14 See id. at 44. 
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Part I of this note provides a brief history of the FTCA 
and the 1974 law enforcement amendment. Part II discusses 
the differences between the obligations of law enforcement 
officers and private citizens, and the problems that arise when 
applying the private person standard of the FTCA to the 
actions of law enforcement officers. Part III discusses the 
recent case law in the area and details why the current judicial 
approaches are unsatisfactory. Lastly, Part IV provides a 
recommendation for how the FTCA could be modified by 
Congress to better address the concerns that arise in law 
enforcement cases. 
I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
To fully explain the role that the FTCA plays in suits 
brought against the United States, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The idea of 
sovereign immunity was inherited from English law,15 under 
which “[the King could] not be compelled to answer in his own 
court . . . .”16 This concept enjoyed widespread acceptance in 
America during the nation’s founding,17 and continues to be 
applicable today.18 The practical effect of sovereign immunity is 
that “the United States may not be sued without its consent.”19 
Thus, the federal government can only be sued where it has 
waived its right to this immunity, and then only under the 
conditions that it prescribes.20 This doctrine places a 
substantial, and sometimes insurmountable, burden on would-
be plaintiffs.21 Despite this doctrine, throughout our nation’s 
  
 15 LESTER JAYSON & ROBERT LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS § 2.01 (2010). 
 16 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 n.6 (1979) (quoting 1 FREDERICK 
POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1899)). 
 17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 318 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean 
eds., 1788) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit 
of an individual without its consent.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the 
Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 443 (2005) (statements 
by James Madison and John Marshall). 
 18 United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (2009) (“The Federal 
Government cannot be sued without its consent.”). 
 19 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). 
 20 Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 501 (1967) (“It is well settled, of course, that 
the Government is ordinarily immune from suit, and that it may define the conditions 
under which it will permit such actions.”). 
 21 See Chelsea Sage Durkin, Comment, How Strong Stands the Federal Tort 
Claims Act Wall? The Effect of the Good Samaritan and Negligence Per Se Doctrines on 
Governmental Tort Liability, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 270 (2007). 
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history Congress has continually provided remedies for 
individuals harmed by actions of the federal government and 
its employees.22 The FTCA is the largest and most notable 
waiver of sovereign immunity.23 This section briefly discusses 
the remedies that were available prior to the FTCA, the 
enactment of that statute, and the 1974 amendment. 
A. Remedies Prior to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
Early in our nation’s history, the only remedy available 
to citizens harmed by the actions of the federal government and 
its actors was through the private bill system, where an 
individual would lobby his or her representative in Congress to 
pass specific legislation granting monetary relief.24 
Dissatisfaction with this process emerged as early as 1832,25 
resulting in a number of different congressional acts that 
provided remedies for a few specific harms.26 These remedies 
were limited because they usually required the approval of the 
executive branch that had caused the harm before any 
compensation would be awarded.27 Moreover, the types of 
scenarios that were compensable under these acts were very 
limited—for example, damage to oyster growers arising from 
dredging operations or other equipment while making river 
and harbor improvements that were approved by Congress—
and only one of these bills actually addressed the area of 
domestic law enforcement.28  
The one act that was aimed at the law enforcement 
function was passed in 1936 when Congress recognized the need 
to compensate individuals harmed by agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).29 This legislation came on the 
heels of a series of incidents where civilians were harmed during 
attempts to capture John Dillinger, a notorious bank robber in 
  
 22 See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 15, §§ 2.05, 2.10. 
 23 Id. § 1.03. 
 24 See id. § 2.01. 
 25 See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 49 (1942) (“As early as February 23, 1832, John 
Quincy Adams wrote: ‘There ought to be no private business before Congress. . . . It is 
judicial business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do with it.’”). 
 26 Id. § 2.05. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. Several of these bills did address damage caused by the armed 
services, but those are distinct from domestic law enforcement. See id. 
 29 Act of Mar. 20, 1936, ch. 159, § 2603, 49 Stat. 1184, 1184-85 (1936) (current 
version at 31 U.S.C. § 3724 (2006)). 
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the 1930s.30 Congress, acknowledging the unique responsibilities 
of these officers, stated that “[agents] must be free to act on the 
spur of the moment and in the most reasonable manner which 
the particular circumstances may afford.”31 Notwithstanding this 
legislation, Congress remained inundated with private bills.32 
The various remedies available simply did not cover the vast 
majority of the scenarios where individuals could be harmed by 
the actions of government actors. 
B. The Federal Tort Claims Act and the 1974 Amendment 
In response to the continued influx of private bills, 
Congress passed the FTCA as a part of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946.33 The FTCA was broadly written so 
that it would define the liability of the United States in all 
circumstances where a federal employee, acting in the course of 
his or her employment, was alleged to have committed a tort.34 
It was not the first attempt at passing legislation to confer 
jurisdiction on the courts for these suits.35 Similar bills had 
been under consideration for years, but had failed to pass 
because of disagreements within Congress.36 Congress hoped 
that authorizing tort suits against the United States would 
eliminate the need for private legislation, and that justice 
would be better served by having a continually operating and 
uniform process for addressing these claims.37  
The result is that the FTCA grants federal courts 
jurisdiction in any case brought against the United States where 
injuries to persons or property are “caused by [a] negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government 
  
 30 There were two such incidents. One resulted in three civilians being shot 
during a raid on the Little Bohemia resort in rural Wisconsin, and the second caused 
minor injuries to civilians in Chicago. See ALSTON PURVIS & ALEX TRESNIOWSKI, THE 
VENDETTA: FBI HERO MELVIN PURVIS’S WAR AGAINST CRIME, AND J. EDGAR HOOVER’S 
WAR AGAINST HIM 91, 109-11 (2005) (describing the incident at Little Bohemia); 
Dillinger Slain in Chicago; Shot Dead by Federal Men in Front of Movie Theatre, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 22, 1934, at 1 (reporting on the shooting in Chicago). 
 31 H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936). This act is still in force for agencies 
within the Department of Justice for harms that are not covered by the FTCA. See 31 
U.S.C. § 3724 (2006). 
 32 See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 15, § 2.08. 
 33 Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 
2671-2680 (2006)). 
 34 See id. 
 35 H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 2-3. 
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while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where . . . a private person would be liable . . . in 
accordance with the place where the act or omission occurred.”38 
Moreover, “the United States shall be liable . . . in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under 
like circumstances.”39 Thus, the FTCA performs both the 
function of abrogating sovereign immunity and defining the 
liability of the federal government.40 In both of these functions, 
the FTCA defines the standard of liability for the United States 
as equivalent to the liability of private persons under state law.41 
The government does, however, retain defenses related to 
judicial and legislative immunity, and “any other defenses to 
which the United States is entitled.”42 
The FTCA also includes several exceptions.43 One of those 
is the intentional tort exception, which bars all suits against the 
United States for claims “arising out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference 
with contract rights.”44 As originally enacted, this exception 
applied to the actions of all federal employees.45 
During the early 1970s, however, a series of incidents 
involving agents of the newly created Office for Drug Abuse 
Law Enforcement (DALE) prompted Congress to reconsider 
this exception when intentional torts were committed by 
federal law enforcement officers.46 Although there were several 
  
 38 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 39 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). 
 40 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (“The Tort Claims Act was 
designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits 
in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as 
a private individual would be under like circumstances.”).  
 41 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. 
 42 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 
 43  See HENRY COHEN & VANESSA K. BURROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AM. 
LAW. DIV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 1-2 (2007) 
[hereinafter CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS]. These exceptions include the Feres doctrine, 
which disallows liability injuries by military personnel incident to service; the 
discretionary function exception; the intentional tort exception; and an exception for an 
employee exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, regardless of 
that statute’s validity. Id. 
 44 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970).  
 45  Id. 
 46 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 
2791-2792; compare 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970), with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006) (The 
latter was amended to state that “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or 
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this 
chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the 
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reported incidents of abuse by DALE agents, the most notable 
was a highly publicized series of “no knock” raids that occurred 
in Collinsville, Illinois.47 On April 29, 1973, DALE agents broke 
down the door of the Giglottos’ home in Collinsville, handcuffed 
the couple, threatened them with violence, and ransacked their 
house before realizing that they were at the wrong location.48 
The agents quickly left the home, refusing to explain their 
actions.49 All of this occurred within approximately thirty 
minutes.50 The agents did not obtain a warrant or even properly 
identify themselves to the couple.51 An almost identical scene 
was replayed later that evening when DALE agents mistakenly 
raided a second family’s home, also in Collinsville.52 As a result 
of the intentional tort exception to the FTCA, these families 
were left without a remedy under the Act because the agents 
had acted intentionally rather than negligently.53 Congress 
responded to this injustice by passing the 1974 amendment.54 
Unlike the original FTCA, the 1974 amendment specifically 
addressed the actions of law enforcement officers, but only in 
relation to the intentional tort exception.55  
The amendment provided that the United States could be 
held liable for any claims “arising . . . out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 
  
date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution.”). 
 47 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2. 
 48 Illinois: In the Name of the Law, TIME, May 14, 1973, available at 
http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,907220,00.html.  
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2. It was noted that a violation of these 
individuals’ constitutional rights was actionable against the individual agents under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); however, that remedy was 
considered insufficient because many federal agents are likely to be judgment proof. S. 
REP. NO. 93-588, at 2. 
 54 Act to Amend Reorganization Plan Numbered 2 of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006)). It is noteworthy 
that Congress was discussing the need to provide compensation to victims of 
constitutional torts, but did not desire to limit this amendment to include only those 
actions that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 
(“[T]he Committee’s amendment should not be viewed as limited to constitutional tort 
situations.”). Interestingly, the resulting statute expressly disallowed actions based on 
constitutional torts because it subjected this amendment to the other provisions of the 
FTCA, including the requirement that the United States be liable in accordance with 
state law. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[T]he United States simply 
has not rendered itself liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”). 
 55 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 2-3. 
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prosecution,” based on “the acts or omissions of federal 
investigative or law enforcement officers.”56 By acknowledging 
that the federal government should be liable for these 
intentional torts when committed by law enforcement officers, 
but not by other federal employees, Congress recognized that 
this unique area of federal activity creates circumstances that 
are different from the other areas of government action. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress’s intent was to 
compensate victims of law enforcement abuses, but not for harm 
caused during the valid execution of law enforcement authority.57 
While the 1974 amendment took a much-needed step by 
providing a remedy to victims of law enforcement abuse, it did 
not change the overall standard of liability for the actions of 
law enforcement officers. The result is that liability for the 
actions of federal law enforcement officers is still determined 
by the liability of a private person in like circumstances, just as 
it would be in the case of any other government employee.58 The 
remainder of this note discusses why the private person 
standard is inappropriate for determining liability in the law 
enforcement context, and the need for the FTCA to be modified 
yet again to account for the unique role that law enforcement 
plays in American society and the inherent differences between 
law enforcement officers and private citizens. 
II. THE PRIVATE PARTY ANALOGUE AND POLICY ISSUES 
RAISED BY ITS APPLICATION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT SUITS 
The primary difficulty in applying the FTCA to cases 
involving the actions of law enforcement officers is the private 
person standard for determining the liability of the 
government.59 This standard, which was not addressed by the 
1974 amendment, is often implemented by using a private 
party analogue (PPA).60 This process involves finding a private 
party that would be in “like circumstances” and trying the case 
  
 56 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
 57 See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 858 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J., 
concurring); S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3.  
 58 Id. 
 59 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006). As provided in the FTCA, the government is 
liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances.” Id. 
 60 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-10, United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 
43 (2005) (No. 04-759). 
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as if the federal actor was that private person.61 For example, a 
doctor at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital would be compared 
to a private doctor at a private hospital for the purposes of 
assessing liability. Thus, if a state were to implement a shield 
of liability for all publicly employed doctors, that shield would 
not protect the doctor employed by the federal government 
because a public employee is not a private person.62 Similarly, if 
state employees were held to a higher standard than private 
individuals, the United States would not be held to that 
heightened standard.63 Normally, finding a comparable private 
party for purposes of assessing liability is a fairly simple 
endeavor;64 however, law enforcement activities present a 
challenge because private citizens do not have the same 
authority or responsibility to enforce laws as government 
agents.65 This problem was well articulated by the Ninth 
Circuit in Louie v. United States: 
Questions as to the power and authority to arrest, to maintain 
custody, and to lawfully restrict a person’s liberty, are unique to the 
law enforcement function. Because private persons do not wield such 
police powers, the inquiry into the government’s liability in this 
situation must include an examination of the liability of state and 
municipal entities under like circumstances.66 
Recently, the appropriate PPA for the actions of law 
enforcement was raised at the oral argument in Olson, where 
the Justices questioned the government about what PPA would 
apply to the actions of federal law enforcement officials.67 During 
that discussion, Chief Justice Roberts offered the possibility that 
“if it’s a police officer stopping somebody on a highway, it’s the 
same as a private security guard stopping somebody.”68 
  
 61 Id. at 6-7. 
 62 See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44-45 (2005) (directly overruling 
Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that the 
United States could be shielded from liability by applying state law granting immunity 
to state employees). 
 63 See, e.g., Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664, 
at *3-4 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000); Crider v. United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 64 Durkin, supra note 21, at 273. 
 65 See Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 819, 825 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 66 Id. (internal quotations omitted). The context of the Louie case made it an 
interesting choice for the court to depart from the private person standard because 
under the facts of the case the liability of municipal entities and private persons was 
the same under Washington law. Id. 
 67 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 4-10. 
 68 See id. at 7. 
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However, no private citizen is truly comparable to a law 
enforcement officer,69 and it seems counterintuitive that the 
unique characteristics of these officers would go without 
consideration when determining the government’s liability for 
their actions. Although citizens should be compensated for any 
wrongful conduct of law enforcement officers, failing to 
consider the differences between law enforcement officers and 
private persons when determining liability could place an 
undue burden on the agencies and officers that have an 
affirmative duty to uphold the law. 
Law enforcement officers are unique because of the 
extensive training they receive and the fact that the 
government places responsibilities on those officers that are 
not applicable to private persons.70 As one commentator put it, 
“There are many . . . differences between [law enforcement] 
officers and civilians: officers cannot ‘call the police’ to avoid 
using force; they often are not permitted to retreat; they are 
trained and prepared to use force; and they routinely and 
legitimately initiate contact that subsequently requires force to 
be used.”71 These differences generally give rise to a more 
deferential standard of liability.72  
Of course, simply stating that it is logical to use 
different standards to determine liability for law enforcement 
officers and private citizens does not by itself explain why the 
private person standard is undesirable. The problem is that 
using a stricter standard of liability will create an incentive for 
law enforcement officers to be overly cautious in discharging 
their duties, which will result in a suboptimal level of law 
enforcement.73 Recognizing this issue, one court stated, “If law 
  
 69 See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1119, 1182-83 (2008). 
 70 Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 74-2034, at 2 (1936) (“[FBI agents] must be free to 
act on the spur of the moment and in the most reasonable manner which the particular 
circumstances may afford, and they have been trained to this end.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 cmt. g (1977) (“The additional privilege is given because the 
peace officer has a duty to the public to prevent crime and arrest criminals.”). 
 71 Harmon, supra note 69, at 1182. 
 72 See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(“[W]hat may be reasonable for police officers may not always be reasonable for 
ordinary citizens.”); Munoz v. City of Union City, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 545 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2004) (“Appellants are correct . . . that police officers are given more deference in 
judging the reasonableness of use of force than a private citizen would be.”). 
 73 This is especially true because the difference between desirable and 
undesirable conduct in this instance is “vanishingly small.” William J. Stuntz, The Virtues 
and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1997). Stuntz’s 
article addresses the merits of the exclusionary rule; however, it is equally applicable in this 
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enforcement officers are compelled to keep the peace at their 
peril, without some discretion as to how to respond to an 
apparent crisis, the peace will simply not be kept.”74 Still, at 
least under the FTCA, these officers are not keeping the peace 
“at their peril” in a strict sense because the officers themselves 
are not liable under that statute.75 Nevertheless, assigning 
liability to the government rather than to the officer will create 
the same incentive, just at a higher level within the hierarchy 
of the enforcement agency.76 It is unlikely that an officer would 
be indifferent to the possibility that the government could be 
held liable based on his or her conduct, either because of a 
feeling of loyalty to the agency or out of concern that costing 
the government money would have a negative effect on her 
career. Indeed, “even where officers are indemnified, it is 
reasonable to suppose that there are immense political costs (in 
the sense of everyday workplace politics) associated with a 
finding of liability and exposing the municipal employer to 
budgetary pay-outs.”77 
To avoid making law enforcement officers overly-
cautious in the course of their duties, the liability of the United 
States should reflect these officers’ unique responsibilities and 
training. This would ensure that the liability of the government 
is better aligned with a standard of conduct that permits 
officers to do their job effectively.78 Unfortunately, the private 
  
context because both the exclusionary rule and civil liability provide remedies for the 
violations of an acceptable standard of conduct in the context of law enforcement. 
 74 Arrington v. Moore, 358 A.2d 909, 916 (Md. App. 1976). For a discussion of 
the risks of over-deterrence in the context of the Fourth Amendment, see Stuntz, supra 
note 73, at 445-46. 
 75 See Act of Aug. 2, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2780 (2006)). 
 76 See Stuntz, supra note 73, at 446 (discussing the effects of holding state 
governments liable for damages as a result of Fourth Amendment violations). 
 77 Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent 
Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 854-55 (2001). 
 78 See Act of May 2, 1792, § 9, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 265 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 564 
(2006)) (recognizing that federal authority should be coextensive with state authority). 
Also, although it is outside of the scope of this note, it is worth considering whether or 
not we should use this distinction to further incentivize law enforcement officers to use 
their skills in situations where a private person would be under no such obligation. See 
Lisa McCabe, Note, Police Officers’ Duty to Rescue or Aid: Are They the Only Good 
Samaritans?, 72 CAL. L. REV. 661, 681 (1984) (arguing that law enforcement should be 
held to a higher duty to rescue than ordinary citizens). Some jurisdictions already 
differentiate between private persons and local law enforcement officials in 
determining a duty to rescue. See Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ala. 1971), 
rev’d on other grounds, Monroe v. City Council for City of Anchorage, 545 P.2d 165 
(Ala. 1976). However, the additional duties placed on local law enforcement officers do 
not currently apply to federal officers. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143, 
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party standard of the FTCA, as currently interpreted, makes it 
impossible to take these factors into account. 
III. RECENT CASES DEALING WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
ACTIONS AND THE FTCA 
Recognizing that law enforcement activities are not well 
suited to the private person standard, several courts, led by the 
Ninth Circuit, had previously rejected the PPA approach in 
circumstances involving federal law enforcement officers.79 The 
Ninth Circuit also set the high water mark for this approach by 
allowing state immunity statutes to shield the federal 
government from liability in certain cases.80 By contrast, the 
Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits refused to apply statutory 
immunity to the federal government, but they still applied 
general law enforcement privileges and used the more 
deferential standards of reasonableness that applied to local 
officers when determining negligent behavior.81 However, in 
2005, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Olson 
rejected the proposition that the private party requirement of 
the FTCA can be set aside, even for actions that are uniquely 
governmental.82 This holding has resulted in uncertainty as to 
what standard should apply in law enforcement cases.83 At least 
four different judicial approaches have arisen since Olson, none 
  
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664, at *3-4 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000) (holding that the United 
States was protected from liability by the local “Good Samaritan” statute, even though 
local law enforcement officers would be subject to a separate test to determine if they 
had a duty to render aid). 
 79 See Hetzel v. United States, 43 F.3d 1500, 1503-04 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Crider 
v. United States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989); Louie v. United States, 776 F.2d 
819, 825 (9th Cir. 1985); Tomcsik v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 
1989), aff’d, 917 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 80 See Cimo v. INS, 16 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing City of 
Sacramento v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)), abrogated 
by United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005); Aguilar v. United States, 920 F.2d 1475, 
1476 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Olson, 546 U.S. 43. 
 81 See Hetzel, 43 F.3d at 1503-04; Crider, 885 F.2d at 296; Tomcsik, 720 F. 
Supp. at 591. In some cases the distinction between a statute granting immunity and a 
statute defining a standard of care is blurry at best. See Hetzel, 43 F.3d at 1506 
(Williams, J., concurring). If a statute defines the extent of law enforcement’s immunity 
according to a specific standard of conduct, that statute can be serving a dual purpose. Id. 
Moreover, “[a]nytime a court raises the standard of care that defines a legal duty that is 
owed . . . it implicitly immunizes a part of the conduct that otherwise would be considered 
tortious and actionable.” Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 604 (N.J. 1994). 
 82 Olson, 546 U.S. at 45.  
 83 See Cantanho v. United States, No. CV 06-2496, 2009 WL 1160256, at *8-9 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (discussing the uncertainty in the wake of Olson as to 
whether law enforcement privileges apply to suits under the FTCA). 
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of which are entirely satisfactory.84 This section provides a 
discussion of the Olson decision, outlines the four 
interpretations of the FTCA since Olson, and explains why 
none of those approaches is satisfactory. 
A. United States v. Olson 
In Olson, the Supreme Court directly overruled the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that, where the conduct that gave rise 
to the suit was uniquely governmental, courts should look to 
the liability of state and municipal entities to assess the 
liability of the federal government.85 The claim in Olson 
involved allegations that a federal mine inspector was 
negligent, and that his negligence led to the plaintiff suffering 
injuries when a mine he was working in collapsed.86 The 
plaintiff alleged that the inspector failed to follow the 
guidelines of the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA) by failing to properly evaluate several complaints that 
were filed.87 As a result, the weaknesses in the mine were not 
discovered and the plaintiff was still in the mine when the 
ceiling collapsed.88 Approximately nine tons of earth fell where 
he was working.89 The Ninth Circuit looked to Arizona case law, 
under which state mine inspectors could be held liable in 
similar circumstances.90 
On appeal, the Supreme Court first addressed the circuit 
court’s decision to use state employees as the appropriate 
analogue to determine liability in this case.91 The Court rejected 
this comparison as inconsistent with the text of the FTCA.92 
Specifically, it held that the lower court had “read something 
into the act that is not there.”93 Rather, the court stated that the 
words of the FTCA “mean what they say”: the United States is 
to be liable “to the same extent as a private individual.”94 
  
 84 See infra Part III.B. 
 85 Olson, 546 U.S. at 45. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Olson v. United States, 362 F.3d 1236, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
546 U.S. 43, remanded to 433 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 88 Id. at 1238. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1240. 
 91 Olson, 546 U.S. at 45-46. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 44 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674). 
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Moreover, it held that this private person standard of liability 
applies regardless of whether the analogy to a municipal entity 
is being used to escape or to create liability.95  
Next, the court addressed the method of determining 
what private individual would provide an appropriate 
comparison.96 Justice Breyer stated that the words of the FTCA 
require that the liability of the federal government be based on 
the liability of private persons in “like circumstances,” not the 
same circumstances.97 In this case, although no private persons 
in the state were in the same circumstances because there were 
no private mine inspectors, the court should have looked to 
private parties that conduct other types of safety inspections 
because those circumstances were sufficiently similar to the 
mine inspectors.98 
It is important to note that Olson did not involve law 
enforcement activity; however, it is still important in that 
context because of its unequivocal holding that the FTCA 
should be interpreted according to the plain language of the 
statute.99 In light of this decision it is clearly inappropriate to 
make explicit exceptions to the PPA, even if the conduct at 
issue has no realistically comparable analogue in the private 
sector. More than that, because Olson offers no escape 
whatsoever from the private person standard, it can also be 
read to undermine the application of any law enforcement 
privilege given to federal agents, at least for the purposes of 
determining the government’s civil liability.100 This decision has 
featured prominently in recent cases brought based on the 
actions of federal law enforcement officers.  
B. Recent Judicial Interpretations 
In the years since Olson, courts have recognized that 
the Supreme Court has overruled precedent that used 
comparisons to local law enforcement to determine the federal 
government’s liability,101 and in response have fashioned their 
own interpretations of the proper way to apply Olson and the 
  
 95 See id. at 46. 
 96 Id. at 46-47. 
 97 Id. at 46. 
 98 Id. at 47. 
 99 Id. at 44. 
 100 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 101 See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142, 148-50 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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FTCA in the context of federal law enforcement. Before 
discussing possible solutions to the problems that arise under 
the private person standard of liability in this context, it is 
necessary to analyze the current judicial solutions to see if any 
of them adequately address those concerns. Unfortunately, 
none of them offers a truly effective solution.102 Each approach 
is discussed in turn.  
1. The True “Private Person Standard” Interpretation 
Judge Tashima, in the case of Tekle v. United States,103 
offered the first approach to the private person standard of 
liability under Olson. His approach was that, under the plain 
meaning interpretation of the FTCA, the federal government 
should be subject to exactly the same standard of liability as a 
private person, which would include being barred from 
asserting any privileges that are unique to law enforcement.104  
The claims in Tekle were based on the actions of 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents who were executing an 
arrest warrant.105 The agents attempted to execute the warrant 
when the suspects’ children were not home, but one of the 
children was in fact present during the arrest.106 The child 
exited the house before the arrest began and was handcuffed 
and held at gunpoint while the arrest was completed.107 The 
child was allegedly subjected to abusive treatment in the form 
  
 102 Although the cases below address the private person requirement in the 
context of negligence and the application of privileges in response to intentional torts, 
the issue arises in any situation where the law deals with law enforcement officials. An 
example of another scenario is where a police officer uses force during an arrest where 
there has been some physical threat. This issue was discussed, but not decided, in a 
recent case. See Cantanho v. United States, No. CV 06-2496, 2009 WL 1160256, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (“A police officer is entitled to the even greater use of force 
than might be in the same circumstances required for self defense.” (quoting Brown v. 
Ransweiler, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))). In Cantanho, the result was the same under either standard based on the 
facts of the case, making it unnecessary for the court to determine which standard 
applied under the FTCA. Id. at *9. 
 103 511 F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 104 See id. at 850-54. Although the discussion of this interpretation focuses 
primarily on the issues that arise under the standard of citizen’s arrest, it is important 
to note that this approach also suffers from the same problems as the following 
interpretation when it comes to claims of negligence. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 105 Tekle, 511 F.3d at 842. 
 106 Id. 
 107 See id. at 843. 
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of abusive comments, spitting on his shoes, and pulling him off 
the ground by the handcuffs.108  
Judge Tashima stated that, although law enforcement 
officers are generally given greater authorization than ordinary 
citizens in deciding when to make an arrest,109 the government 
was not entitled to that privilege under a strict interpretation of 
the FTCA.110 The facts alleged in Tekle seem egregious enough to 
warrant compensation under any standard; however, the use of 
a citizen’s arrest statute to determine the federal government’s 
liability could create issues in other scenarios. As Tekle pointed 
out, many citizen’s arrest statutes are more limited than the 
authority granted to law enforcement officers.111 For example, the 
citizen’s arrest statute in California only authorizes an arrest 
without a warrant if a misdemeanor has been witnessed, where 
the individual has actually committed a felony, or where a felony 
has actually taken place and the arrestor has reason to believe 
that the individual being arrested was responsible for that 
felony.112 Therefore, it follows that if a person is arrested without 
a warrant, even with probable cause, the arrestor could be held 
liable if no felony was actually committed.113 It is possible to 
imagine a scenario where a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 
agent observes a suspect carrying a bag of white powder out of a 
building and chooses to detain that person. If the white powder 
turned out to be cocaine or some other drug then the detention of 
that person would be authorized for peace officers and citizens 
alike.114 If, however, the powder turned out to be something 
harmless, then the arrest would not be protected by the citizen’s 
arrest privilege since no misdemeanor was committed in the 
  
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. at 851, 854 (stating that although the standard applicable to a 
citizen’s arrest has been considered inappropriate for application to law enforcement, 
the holding in Olson requires that the court apply that standard); see also Tomlin v. 
State, 869 P.2d 334, 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that, in Oklahoma, a citizen’s 
right to make an arrest is more narrow than that of a peace officer). 
 110 Tekle, 511 F.3d at 851, 854. 
 111 See id. at 854. 
 112 CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 2009). 
 113 This corresponds to the common law rule. See United States v. Hillsman, 
522 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1975); Allen v. Lopinsky, 94 S.E. 369 (W. Va. 1917); Napier v. 
Sheridan, 547 P.2d 1399 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 119 
cmt. i at 197 (1965). But see Burton v. McNeill, 13 S.E. 10 (S.C. 1941); Stevenson v. 
State, 413 A.2d 1340 (Md. 1980). 
 114  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 837. The possession of cocaine would be an actual 
felony, and, at least for the purposes of this example, the visual observation would 
provide the requisite probable cause. 
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presence of the agent and no felony was actually committed.115 
The agent would be personally protected from civil liability116 and 
criminal charges117 by the applicable statute, but under Judge 
Tashima’s interpretation of the FTCA, that protection would not 
be extended to the United States in a corresponding false 
imprisonment claim.118 Although it seems absurd that the 
government would be liable in this scenario, it is a possibility 
under this approach to the FTCA.119 Even though the officers 
retain a level of personal immunity, liability on the part of the 
government could still lead to officers being overly cautious, 
thereby making them less effective in carrying out their duties.120 
2. The “Privileges Expressly Granted by Federal 
Statute” Interpretation 
The next interpretation of the private person 
requirement came from Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in 
Tekle.121 Judge Fisher opined that even after the decision in 
Olson, the United States was entitled to assert law 
enforcement privileges granted by federal statute in actions 
  
 115 As noted previously, not all states require that a felony actually be 
committed. See, e.g., Stevenson, 413 A.2d 1340; Burton, 13 S.E. 10. However, in many 
jurisdictions the felony requirement is still in place. See Hillsman, 522 F.2d 454; Allen, 
945 S.E. 369; Napier, 547 P.2d 1399. Moreover, liability could arise if the detention was 
categorized as an arrest or as an investigative (Terry) stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968), because in many jurisdictions private citizens have no special authority to 
make a Terry stop unless a citizen’s arrest would also be justified. See United States v. 
Sealed Juvenile 1, 255 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Atwell, 470 F. 
Supp. 2d 554, 564-65 (D. Md. 2007); Commonwealth v. Gullick, 435 N.E.2d 348, 351 
(Mass. 1982); Garner v. State, 779 S.W.2d 498, 501 (Tex. App. 1989). 
 116 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2006). 
 117 In this hypothetical that statute would be 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3) (2006). 
 118 As another commentator noted, the idea that the statutory privilege 
granted to these agents applies to them individually but not to the government seems 
unusual, to say the least. See Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. It is worth pointing out, 
however, that although this is undesirable, it is not entirely irrational. An argument 
could be made that individuals who are wrongly arrested should receive some 
compensation, but if that compensation came from the agents themselves it would be a 
great disincentive to becoming a law enforcement officer. 
 119 Although it is not mentioned in the Tekle opinion, the government could 
argue that the decision to detain the plaintiff fell under the discretionary function 
exception of the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). This argument has enjoyed 
some success in the courts. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 934-35 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (decision when to arrest a suspect is a discretionary function). 
 120 See supra Part II. 
 121 Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J., 
concurring). 
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under the FTCA.122 He reasoned that this approach was 
necessary to avoid conflicts between statutes that grant law 
enforcement privileges to federal agents, in this case 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7608, and the FTCA.123 He also noted that, because the 
Supreme Court did not expressly foreclose the use of law 
enforcement privileges in FTCA cases, to disallow the 
application of these privileges was unnecessary and would force 
courts to reach absurd results.124 
This argument is attractive because it effectively 
harmonizes two statutes that seem to be in conflict under the 
purely private person standard.125 The conflict arises because 26 
U.S.C. § 7608 authorizes a privilege, and the FTCA, at least 
under a strict interpretation, would deny the same privilege in 
proceedings to determine the government’s liability.  
Unfortunately, the limitations of this approach arise out 
of its reasoning. Because the argument states that the private 
person requirement should be limited to avoid a conflict of 
statutes, it is logical that where the conflict between statutes 
ends, the strict PPA should go back into effect. Hence, even 
though the federal statute cited by Judge Fisher provides IRS 
agents with the privilege to undertake arrests and searches, 
thereby trumping the use of a citizen’s arrest statute to 
determine the false imprisonment claim, there is no statutory 
privilege that addresses the appropriate standard for negligence 
actions or defines the use of force during an arrest.126 Without 
additional statutory privilege, there is no justification for courts 
to treat federal agents any differently than how they would treat 
  
 122 Id. at 857. The district court chose to apply this approach to the private 
person requirement on remand. See Tekle v. United States, No. CV 01-3894-RSWL, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39091, at *26-27 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2009). 
 123 Tekle, 511 F.3d at 857 (Fisher, J., concurring). 
 124 Id. at 858. It is not entirely clear that there is a conflict between the 
privileges afforded to IRS agents in the statute cited by the court, 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(2) 
(2006), and the privileges afforded to private persons generally. That statute authorizes 
agents to “execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants.” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7608(a)(2). A similar privilege has been recognized as applicable to private persons. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 122, 213 (1977) (citing privileges to arrest or to 
enter land pursuant to a court order). The conflict between the citizen’s arrest statute and 
the privilege afforded to the IRS agents under federal statute arises only when agents are 
making an arrest based on probable cause that the suspect has committed a felony. 
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(3), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 834 (West 2009).  
 125 Tekle, 511 F.3d at 857-58 (Fisher, J., concurring) (citing California ex rel. 
Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th 
Cir. 2000)). 
 126 See 26 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006). Statutes granting privileges to other law 
enforcement agencies are similar. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 878 (2006) (DEA); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3052 (2006) (FBI). 
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a private citizen in these other claims.127 So while this 
interpretation takes the court part of the way toward handling 
the problems created by the private person requirement of the 
FTCA, it still falls short in how it addresses certain scenarios. 
These deficiencies could still act to impair the enforcement of 
laws and indirectly impinge on executive policy. 
This problem can be seen in Sauceda v. United States, 
which is currently being litigated in the District of Arizona.128 In 
that case, the plaintiffs were harmed when a Border Patrol 
agent allegedly deployed a controlled tire deflation device 
(CTDD) while attempting to apprehend a vehicle containing a 
number of illegal immigrants.129 The plaintiff brought a claim 
based on negligence and suggested that an appropriate PPA 
would either be a person throwing a water balloon at a car, 
which seems like a particularly poor analogy, or, perhaps more 
appropriately, a shopkeeper attempting to detain someone 
suspected of shoplifting.130 The second option seems much more 
fitting because it involves a party attempting to stop an 
individual suspected of committing a crime on his or her 
premises. In addition, many corporations and retailers have 
security guards on their grounds.131 
Under Judge Fisher’s approach, the United States 
would be entitled to assert privileges that have been expressly 
granted by statute; however, there is no federal statute that 
grants the government greater deference in negligence 
actions.132 Without a statute granting this additional privilege, 
the private person standard would apply. Thus, for a 
negligence claim, the court must use analogies to water balloon 
throwers, private security guards, and shopkeepers to 
determine whether or not the alleged deployment of the CTDD 
  
 127 The result would seem to be similar to the Second Circuit’s approach in an 
earlier case, where the court evaluated the government’s liability as it would a private 
“person having legal authority to participate in the . . . raid at issue.” Castro v. United 
States, 34 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 128 Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009). 
 129 Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-
DGC (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Defendant’s Reply Memorandum]. It was 
contested whether the agent deployed the CTDD or simply dropped it while trying to 
avoid being hit by the oncoming vehicle. Id. 
 130 Id. at 8.  
 131 Moreover, this analogy seems to be in keeping with the opinion of Chief 
Justice Roberts as expressed during the oral argument for Olson. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 7. 
 132  Westlaw search conducted by author on Nov. 22, 2010. 
794 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
was reasonable. Under any of these analogies, the United 
States would almost surely be held liable. It is difficult to 
imagine any court sanctioning the use of a CTDD by a private 
party under any circumstances.133 Even under the 
shopkeeper/security guard analogy, which would certainly be 
more flexible, it is hard to conceive of a scenario where those 
individuals would be allowed to use a CTDD without incurring 
liability.134 Just the idea of a retail security guard throwing stop 
sticks under the car of a suspected thief seems outlandish. On 
the other hand, law enforcement agents are clearly permitted 
to use these instruments in the appropriate circumstances,135 
and it seems entirely natural, and even desirable, for them to 
do so. By analogizing to a private person, that is, a private 
security guard, federal agents are more limited than local law 
enforcement officers in the methods available to them in 
apprehending suspects, at least without incurring liability on 
behalf of the government. As discussed above, this has 
potentially serious drawbacks for the enforcement of agencies’ 
responsibilities.136 Thus, this interpretation is ultimately 
insufficient to fully address the private person problem. 
  
 133 This problem arises under multiple tort claims. For example, a plaintiff 
could argue, as did the plaintiff in Sauceda, that the deployment of the CTDD was 
negligent under the circumstances. Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *5. A plaintiff could 
also argue that the agent committed the intentional tort of assault or battery by using 
the CTDD. Although private citizens are allowed to use some force in effecting an 
arrest without incurring liability for battery or other intentional torts, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 119, 132 (1977), it still seems unlikely that a 
court would allow citizens to use such devices. As a general rule, private persons do not 
have the training or the experience to know how and when to use these types of tools. 
See supra Part II. 
 134 Defendant’s Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 8-9. In Sauceda, this 
argument was made by the government, but ultimately proved unpersuasive. Sauceda, 
2009 WL 3756703, at *5. Judge Campbell stated that the question at issue was 
whether or not this particular incident constituted negligence, not whether or not every 
deployment of a CTDD would be negligence under a purely private person standard. Id. 
It is also of interest here that Judge Campbell endorses the opinion of Judge Fisher 
that law enforcement privileges should be available to federal agents; however, the 
government argued no such privilege. Id. Moreover, in this particular instance the 
regulations governing the use of force by Border Patrol agents do not offer much 
guidance. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (2008). 
 135 See United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 886-89 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Estate of Curran v. N.C. Dep’t of Crime Control & Public Safety, No. COA08-305, 2009 
WL 131178, at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009). Although the facts in Guzman-Padilla 
also concern agents of the Border Patrol, the facts are different than those in Sauceda 
because the latter dealt with an arrest whereas the former was not considered an 
arrest but merely a border stop. Compare Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, at *4, with 
Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d at 885-86. 
 136 See supra Part II. 
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Beyond the concerns expressed above, applying the 
private person requirement to law enforcement activity could 
also undermine the “discretionary function” exception to the 
FTCA. “The discretionary function exception is the most 
significant exception to government liability that is explicitly 
provided for in the FTCA.”137 It disallows claims “based upon 
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function . . . .”138 The exception is based 
largely on separation of powers concerns.139  
Before granting immunity under the discretionary 
function exception, a court must determine what conduct the 
claim is based upon and if that conduct is protected by the 
exception.140 The question of whether or not the conduct is 
discretionary involves a two-part test: (1) does the conduct 
involve a choice, rather than a mandated action, and (2) is it 
the kind of discretion that Congress intended.141 This exception 
has significant practical effects on suits against the United 
States, because if the government can successfully argue that 
the actions taken by a law enforcement official were actually 
caused by a policy decision made at a planning level, then the 
discretionary exception will apply.142 However, that argument is 
often difficult to apply to the actions of federal agents carrying 
out a spur-of-the-moment search or arrest.143 Moreover, the 
discretionary function exception does not rule out the 
possibility that a decision that falls within the discretionary 
function could be carried out negligently. For example, if the 
FBI chose to use tear gas as part of an operation, that decision 
would be considered within the discretionary function 
exception.144 On the other hand, the discretionary function 
would not bar a claim that the FBI agents deployed the tear 
  
 137 CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 9. 
 138 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006). 
 139 Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception to 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 703 (1997). 
 140 Id. at 696. 
 141 Id. at 704-05. 
 142 See id. at 715-17. 
 143 See Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(finding that if the discretionary function were drawn too broadly it would prevent 
government liability for actions like the Collinsville raids that Congress clearly 
intended to be compensable); Morales v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“[T]o expand the exception to encompass any government act or decision that 
simply involved the exercise of discretion would entirely eviscerate, and contradict, the 
Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA.”). 
 144 Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431, 466 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
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gas in a negligent manner.145 This can be a somewhat narrow 
distinction, and it is possible that imposing a private person 
standard on the government in a case like Sauceda could 
violate the spirit of the discretionary function exception, even if 
it only attacks the individual officer’s actions in carrying out 
that policy decision. This argument closely parallels the one 
above, but with emphasis on the policy concerns expressed by 
the discretionary function exception. 
In Sauceda, the Border Patrol had made the policy 
decision to allow its officers to use CTDD devices.146 Presumably, 
the Border Patrol weighed the policy benefits of enforcing its 
duties against the potential dangers of using CTDD devices and 
made a decision that they were appropriate for use, at least 
under certain conditions. That decision is analogous to a decision 
by the FBI to use tear gas as part of a planned raid, and it is 
exactly the type of discretion that Congress intended to protect 
by including the discretionary function exception.147 But the 
question presented in Sauceda was not whether a CTDD was 
appropriate for use generally, but rather whether the Border 
Patrol agent had used the device negligently in this one 
instance.148 When framed this way, the discretionary function 
exception would not apply because the court is only asking if the 
agent was negligent in the particular way he used the CTDD 
device.149 However, if the United States is liable to the same 
extent as a private person, then almost any use of a CTDD 
would expose the government to potential liability.150 It is at this 
point that the line between liability based on a policy decision 
and liability based on negligent execution begins to blur. If there 
is virtually no scenario where a CTDD can be used without 
incurring liability, then any distinction between assigning 
liability to the policy versus the execution is not much more than 
semantics. If all, or substantially all, uses of CTDDs by Border 
Patrol agents trigger liability, then the sheer threat of that 
  
 145 Id. at 467. 
 146 See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 9. 
 147 See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 466. 
 148 See Sauceda v. United States, No. CV-07-2267-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3756703, 
at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009). 
 149 See Andrade, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 467. 
 150 See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. However, the government is 
still free to assert positive defenses to escape liability. See Sauceda, 2009 WL 3756703, 
at *5 (asserting self-defense). 
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liability will undermine the policy decision by discouraging them 
from ever being used.151  
Thus, although this approach does avoid some of the 
problems that are inherent in the previous interpretation, it 
does not solve the private person problem in its entirety. 
3. The “Privileges Granted by State Law” Interpretation 
The next interpretation, also offered by Judge Fisher, 
posits that state law, in this particular case a state statute, can 
provide privileges to federal law enforcement agents that would 
apply in cases brought under the FTCA.152 To support this 
proposition, he cited California Penal Code § 847(b),153 which 
explicitly provides privileges to federal law enforcement officers 
that are not available to private citizens.154 This analysis relies 
on the fact that liability under the FTCA is determined under 
the law of the state.155 This solution is unacceptable for two 
reasons. It allows the states to usurp Congress’s authority to 
define the liability of the United States, and it has the 
potential to create wide variations in the standards to which 
federal agents are held in each state. 
The first problem with this approach is that it lets the 
states, rather than Congress, decide the extent to which the 
United States is liable. While it is true that Congress chose to 
determine the liability of the United States based on the law of 
  
 151 This argument was rejected by the court on summary judgment. Sauceda, 
2009 WL 3756703, at *3, *5. Unfortunately, the bulk of the decision addressing the 
discretionary function exception of the FTCA is unavailable because it was filed under 
seal. Id. at *3. 
 152 See Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 858-59 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fisher, J., 
concurring). 
 153 CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b) (West 2009) provides, in relevant part: 
There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall 
arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law 
enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section 830.8, acting 
within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment 
arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances: 
(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had 
reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful. 
(2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, 
of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested. 
 154 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 847(b) (West 2009), with CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 834 (West 2009). 
 155 See Tekle, 511 F.3d at 858 (Fisher, J., concurring). At least one other 
circuit has taken the same stance. See Villafranca v. United States, 587 F.3d 257, 262-
64 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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the state in which the act occurred,156 and that has been 
interpreted to include the choice of laws rules of that state,157 
Congress also limited the application of state law by requiring 
that liability be determined according to the law that would 
apply to “a private individual under like circumstances.”158 If 
the words of the FTCA “mean what they say,”159 then it should 
not matter which statutes or case law the individual states 
create to govern the conduct of federal agents, because liability 
is to be assessed according to “the state-law liability of private 
entities, not . . . that of public entities.”160  
Moreover, it is quite likely that in some situations 
Congress intended that the United States be held liable to an 
extent different from that of state law enforcement officers, at 
least for some purposes. For example, suppose that a state 
chose to incorporate federal officers into its definition of peace 
officers or law enforcement officers. In that event, federal 
agents would be entitled to receive all of the privileges of local 
officers within the state; however, if the same state chose to 
place an affirmative duty to rescue on its law enforcement 
officers, then the federal government could be held liable under 
the same duty to rescue,161 or otherwise be excluded from the 
protections of a “Good Samaritan” statute because of their 
status as federal agents.162 While it may be desirable for federal 
agents to have a duty to rescue from a public policy 
perspective,163 it should be Congress, rather than state 
legislatures, that subjects the United States to such a duty. 
The second problem is that the privileges, and 
potentially affirmative duties, applicable to the federal 
government would be subject to wide variation because they 
would come from the law of each individual state. Some states 
  
 156 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (“[W]e have consistently held that 
§ 1346(b)’s reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State—the source of 
substantive liability under the FTCA.”). 
 157 Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 158 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).  
 159 United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). 
 160 Id. at 46 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955)). 
 161 In some states, the fact that federal law enforcement officers have a 
specific area of jurisdiction might exempt them from liability because they would not be 
considered “general law enforcement officials.” Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524, 
1528-29 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 162 Currently, the federal government is protected from liability by the private 
person requirement in these scenarios. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, No. 99-2143, 
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6664, at *3-4, *8-9 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 2000); Crider v. United 
States, 885 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1989).  
 163 See McCabe, supra note 78, at 675. 
2011] ARE POLICE PEOPLE TOO? 799 
might provide some limited privileges to federal agents, some 
might grant full privileges but also impose positive duties, and 
others might not enact statutory protections for federal law 
enforcement at all. The potential for such wide inconsistencies 
in the government’s liability is clearly problematic. There 
would have to be extensive training on what is and is not 
acceptable in each state. However, even if there was little 
variation by state, the liability of the United States should be 
determined by Congress, not by state courts and legislatures.164 
Thus, the incorporation of privilege granted to federal law 
enforcement via state statute is not an optimal solution.165 
4. The “Hybrid” or “Reasonable Person/Reasonable 
Police Officer” Interpretation 
The final approach to determining the government’s 
liability under the private person standard was put forward in 
Lee v. United States.166 In Lee, the United States was sued after 
the capitol police initiated a high-speed chase that ultimately 
resulted in an accident that killed one of the passengers in the 
  
 164 This is not to say that the laws of each individual state have no bearing 
whatsoever on the liability of the United States. In fact, they have a significant effect 
because liability under the FTCA is based on the law of the state in which the wrongful 
act occurs. See Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 571, 582 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003). There is, however, a difference between state courts and legislators defining 
liability for actions of the general population of “private persons,” and determining the 
level of liability that is applicable specifically to federal actors. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 60, at 9-13. This difficulty was explained away in Villafranca v. 
United States, by characterizing a privilege as something that “protects the actor from 
a finding of tortious conduct” as opposed to something that “affects liability.” 587 F.3d 
257, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Garza v. United States, 881 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (S.D. 
Tex. 1995)). This distinction is more form than function. 
 165 A similar approach has been endorsed by a fellow commentator. See 
Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. In that note, the author argues that “if a state were 
to adopt a federal standard, it would be appropriate to look to the federal law to 
determine the question of duty.” Id. This was discussed at the oral argument in Olson, 
where it was admitted that adoption of the federal standard would get you “most of the 
way home in getting [FTCA] . . . liability.” Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, 
at 10. However, this approach would fail to be in keeping with Olson because, as the 
author acknowledges, it would still require a “detour from the strict language of 
§ 2674.” Durkin, supra note 21, at 282-83. Furthermore, although there are federal 
standards for some actions of law enforcement, such as when an arrest is valid, there 
are a myriad of circumstances in which no statute or regulation currently exists. The 
use of a “federal standard” in these cases would be problematic because the FTCA was 
designed to avoid the creation of a common law of torts at the federal level. See Devlin 
v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 532 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he FTCA’s basic thrust was 
decidedly not to create a federal common law of torts, but . . . to tie the government’s 
liability . . . to the disparate and always evolving tort law of the several states.”). 
 166 See Lee v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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fleeing vehicle.167 The court looked to the law that applied to 
private persons to determine the existence of a duty, but 
evaluated whether that duty was breached based on the 
standard of care for local police officers in similar 
circumstances.168 The result is a sort of hybrid of private person 
liability and the standard for liability that would be applicable 
to local police.  
First, the court determined that the federal agents 
involved in this pursuit owed the same general duty of care 
that every private individual driving in the District of 
Columbia owes to other drivers.169 While it acknowledged that 
chasing a suspect is clearly different from a citizen taking an 
everyday drive, the court stated that it was “bound[, by Olson,] 
to consider the circumstances as if the United States were a 
private individual.”170 The court also stated that the United 
States would be held to a pure negligence standard,171 rather 
than the gross negligence standard that would normally apply 
to a pursuit undertaken by local police officers.172 Both of these 
determinations apply the private person standard of the FTCA 
by eschewing the statutory protections given to local officials. 
It was at this point, however, that the court departed 
from the private person standard of liability. The decision went 
on to hold that the appropriate standard of care would be what 
a reasonable police officer would do under the circumstances.173 
In fact, the court concluded that expert testimony would be 
necessary to determine the appropriate standard of care.174 If it 
is inappropriate under Olson to determine what duty is owed to 
a plaintiff by analogizing to local police, then it stands to 
reason that looking to those same police to determine whether 
or not the federal officers’ actions were reasonable would also 
  
 167 Id. at 145. The capitol police were in pursuit of the car because it had been 
stolen during an armed carjacking earlier in the evening. Id. The passenger who was 
injured was not aware that the car was stolen when she accepted a ride from the driver. Id. 
 168 Id. at 151-52. 
 169 Id. at 150.  
 170 Id. at 151. The government’s argument that this was not “a typical drive 
through the streets of the city” is not without merit. Id. In fact, an analogy to a private 
individual attempting to execute a citizen’s arrest would probably be more appropriate. 
 171 See id. 
 172 See Abney v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. 1990). 
 173 Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52, 154.  
 174 Id. at 154. 
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be inappropriate.175 Nevertheless, when faced with the choice of 
determining whether the appropriate standard of care was that 
of a private citizen, such as a private security guard, or a public 
employee, in this case a police officer, this court chose the 
latter.176 The district court did not offer an explanation for its 
departure from the private person analogy in this one area,177 
and there is no provision of the FTCA stating that the private 
person standard applies to determine the existence of a duty 
but not what actions are reasonable under the circumstances.178  
That is not to say that the decision in Lee was unjust. To 
the contrary, by looking at what sort of conduct would be 
reasonable for police officers, the court was able to take into 
account the responsibility and additional training that these 
federal officers possessed, as well as the considerations of over-
deterrence that have shaped tort law as applied to local police 
officers.179 The problem with this approach is not in its result, 
but in its inconsistency with the private person requirement of 
the FTCA under the plain language interpretation of Olson. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 
FTCA 
For the reasons above, none of the judicial 
interpretations of the FTCA post-Olson provide a truly viable 
solution to the problem created by applying the private person 
standard of the FTCA in the law enforcement context. 
Moreover, because of the strict interpretation of the statutory 
language that has been endorsed by the Supreme Court, it is 
unlikely that any truly effective judicial alternative is 
  
 175  See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006) (stating that the United States is liable to the 
same extent as a private individual without making a distinction between the various 
elements of tort claims). 
 176 See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 154. Some courts acknowledged that this practice 
was inappropriate even prior to Olson. See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 39 F. Supp. 2d 
1321, 1323 (D.N.M. 1999) (“Simply by using the phrase ‘private person[]’ [in the FTCA,] 
Congress appears to have decided that federal employees are not to be compared to state 
or local government employees, but to non-public-sector individuals.” (emphasis added)). 
The reasoning the court uses in its decision to use a law enforcement standard of care 
aligns quite closely with this note’s discussion supra Part II. See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 
151-52. Judge Bates cites the challenges that police officers face in discharging their 
duties, including taking risks that would not be appropriate for an ordinary person. Id. 
(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). 
 177 See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52.  
 178 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674-2680 (2006).  
 179 See Lee, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 151-52 (discussing the difficulty in balancing 
the need to apprehend suspects with the risks of pursuit). 
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available. Therefore, the best solution is for Congress to amend 
the statute to clarify the extent to which the United States 
should be held liable when the actions of law enforcement 
agents are at issue. This solution is not limited by the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the existing statute, so it could easily 
address the shortcomings of the FTCA in this area. In addition, 
while addressing the problems of the private person standard, 
Congress should also consider the possibility that states may 
choose to impose affirmative duties on their local law 
enforcement officers, and consider modifying the wording of the 
statute to allow plaintiffs to pursue constitutional tort claims 
under the FTCA.  
Finding a solution to the problems of the private person 
standard of the FTCA is a fairly easy endeavor, and one that 
several courts had adequately handled prior to Olson.180 The 
simplest solution is to add language to the FTCA stating that, 
although the United States is generally liable where a private 
person would be, in cases involving the conduct of law 
enforcement officers, the United States is liable to the same 
extent as local law enforcement. Putting federal law enforcement 
on the same footing as state actors is hardly a novel concept,181 but 
such an amendment would ensure that the civil liability of the 
United States for the actions of these agents is better aligned with 
the unique characteristics of law enforcement officers and the 
policy concerns that arise in that context. 
However, analogizing federal agents to local law 
enforcement officers does present a concern that Congress 
should take into account when revising the FTCA. That is the 
possibility that mirroring the liability of local law enforcement 
could result in additional liability for the United States where 
individual states have chosen to place affirmative duties on law 
enforcement officers to aid the public.182 Moreover, the federal 
  
 180 See supra note 81. 
 181 As early as 1792, Congress ensured that marshals of the United States had 
the same power in enforcing federal law that the law enforcement officers of the state had 
in executing local laws. Act of May 2, 1792, § 9, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 265 (1792) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 564 (2006)). Granted, this act was passed at a time when the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity barred any suit against the federal government, so civil liability was 
not a concern. Nevertheless, the concept that federal officers should not be burdened to a 
greater extent than state actors is equally applicable in the context of civil liability. 
 182 Some states have already chosen to do so. See, e.g., Praet v. Borough of 
Sayreville, 527 A.2d 486, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (“[T]he officers . . . were 
under a duty by virtue of their employment to render emergency assistance to victims 
of automobile accidents.”); Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Ala. 1971) (holding 
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government could lose the benefit of “Good Samaritan” 
statutes, whereas under the private person standard the 
government is able to take advantage of those benefits if its 
officers undertake a rescue attempt.183 As mentioned previously, 
accepting these additional duties might be desirable as a 
matter of policy, but Congress should consider the issue when 
crafting a legislative solution to the private person problem. 
A final issue that should be considered by Congress in 
any amendment to the FTCA in the law enforcement context is 
the fact that, in its current state, constitutional tort claims are 
unavailable under the FTCA.184 In some instances, the actions 
of law enforcement officers might not be compensable under 
state law, but the conduct could create liability under a theory 
of constitutional tort. However, because constitutional torts are 
not cognizable under the FTCA, the federal government is 
shielded from liability for constitutional violations if those 
violations do not fall within a specific state law tort.185 This is 
contrary to the intent of the 1974 amendment to the FTCA; 
namely, that the amendment would address both constitutional 
and non-constitutional torts.186 
An example of this scenario is Washington v. DEA.187 The 
facts in Washington bear a remarkable similarity to the 
Collinsville raids that prompted Congress to amend the FTCA 
in 1974.188 In Washington, an agent of the DEA obtained a 
  
that a policeman was under a duty to render aid to a child who was attacked by a 
lioness at an amusement park). 
 183 See Ortiz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1325 (D.N.M. 1999). 
 184 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994) (“[T]he United States simply 
has not rendered itself liable under [28 U.S.C.] § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”). 
 185 An action would still exist under Bivens, but, the argument goes, any 
judgment rendered would be subject to the individual officer’s financial ability to 
satisfy the judgment. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. This concern is 
arguably unfounded because in many instances defendants are indemnified by the 
United States anyway. See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens 
Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
809, 811 n.2 (2010). Even still, many commentators argue that liability for 
constitutional torts should generally lie with the federal government. See id.; Susan 
Brandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 
340-42 (1995) (noting the hurdles to compensation under Bivens, including qualified 
immunity); William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of 
Government and Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 
1105, 1152-53 (1996). 
 186 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 
2791 (“[T]he Committee’s amendment should not be viewed as limited to constitutional 
tort situations . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 187 Washington v. DEA, 183 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 188 See id. at 871-72. In addition, the Collinsville raids involved agents from 
DALE, which was a precursor to the DEA. Drug Enforcement Administration: 1970-
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warrant to search the plaintiffs’ home based on information 
received from a cooperator, but made no attempt to 
independently corroborate that information.189 When acquiring 
the warrant, the agent requested that it allow for nighttime 
execution, but the magistrate judge did not grant the request.190 
Nevertheless, at approximately 12:30 a.m., DEA agents 
executed the warrant by breaking down the plaintiffs’ door 
with a battering ram, entering the house with weapons drawn, 
ordering the plaintiffs around at gunpoint, threatening them, 
and shoving the husband.191 Plaintiffs, an elderly couple, were 
not physically injured, but they did suffer emotional distress 
and several items in their home were damaged.192 Even though 
no evidence of illegal activity was found, the agents seized 
firearms, ammunition, and personal papers.193 
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit based on several grounds, 
including violations of the U.S. Constitution and FTCA claims 
for assault, battery, and abuse of process.194 After holding that 
the constitutional claims were invalid under the FTCA, the 
court went on to analyze the FTCA claims based on state law.195 
The court held that the agents could not be held liable for 
assault or battery in this case because the force was not more 
than reasonably necessary to ensure their safety during the 
search.196 The result was that the government was not liable in 
this case even though this conduct was particularly egregious. 
This result is inconsistent with the intent of the 1974 
amendment to the FTCA, because this is exactly the type of 
scenario that Congress intended to make compensable when it 
amended the statute.197 While it is debatable whether or not the 
  
1975, at 6-7, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/ 
history/1970-1975.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (charting the genealogy of the DEA). 
Perhaps ironically, the same bill that created the DEA also amended the FTCA to 
create the exception for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement. See S. 
REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791. 
 189 Washington, 183 F.3d at 871. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. at 871-72. It was disputed whether the agents knocked before breaking 
down the door. Id. 
 192 Id. at 870-72. 
 193 Id. at 872. Moreover, the receipt for items seized that was given to the 
plaintiffs at the scene did not include the ammunition or papers seized. Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Washington, 183 F.3d at 873-74. 
 196 Id. at 874. The court also held that there was not sufficient evidence to 
support the abuse of process claim because there was no evidence of a collateral 
purpose, which was a necessary element of that claim. Id. at 875. 
 197 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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actions of the officers in Washington were reasonable for the 
purposes of the assault claim, an analysis of search and seizure 
under the federal constitution would extend beyond the use of 
physical force on a person.198 Under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis, the search could be a violation if it was unreasonable 
for the agents to make a “no-knock” entry199 or to execute the 
warrant at night.200 Therefore, looking beyond the problems 
with the private party standard of liability, Congress could also 
take the opportunity to address this issue. 
For the foregoing reasons, the FTCA should be amended 
to resolve the issues created by the private person standard by 
aligning the liability of the United States with the liability of 
local law enforcement. This could be accomplished by amending 
28 U.S.C. § 2674 with wording similar to the following: 
For any claim under this chapter based on the actions or omissions 
of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States 
Government, the United States shall be liable in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a state or municipality under like 
circumstances.201 
The result would be a statute that would limit the liability of the 
federal government to instances where the actions taken by its 
law enforcement officers reaches the level of abuse, yet still 
would provide officers with the necessary amount of discretion to 
perform their responsibilities. While amending the FTCA to 
address the private person problem, Congress should also 
consider the possibility that this modification might create 
additional positive duties and fashion the amendment 
accordingly. In addition, this amendment would provide 
  
 198 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“The determination of the 
standard of reasonableness . . . requires ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967))). 
 199 See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1998) (explaining when 
“no-knock” entries are justified). 
 200 See United States ex. rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897 (3d Cir. 
1968) (“The time of a police search of an occupied family home may be a significant 
factor in determining whether in a Fourth Amendment sense, the search is 
unreasonable.”). This is particularly likely in this case because nighttime execution 
was requested by the officers, but was not given by the magistrate judge. Washington, 
183 F.3d at 871. It is also possible that in some states, an action could be brought based 
on a theory of constitutional tort under the state constitution. Such an action would be 
cognizable under the FTCA because it would be brought according to the law of the 
state where the alleged wrongful act took place. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006).  
 201 Because the FTCA plays the dual role of abrogating immunity and defining 
liability, see supra note 40 and accompanying text, it would also be necessary to add 
similar modifications to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) to ensure that the jurisdictional 
requirements align with the scope of liability. 
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Congress with an opportunity to effect the true intent of the 
1974 amendment and allow suits under a theory of 
constitutional tort.  
 Only Congress possesses the ability to tailor the FTCA 
to meet the unique challenges of defining the liability of the 
United States under these circumstances. Congress may choose 
to do so as suggested above, or through other means; however, 
it should act to clarify this area of law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This note suggests that liability for law enforcement 
actions under the FTCA should be determined with due 
consideration both of the harms caused to individuals and of the 
potential effects that liability could have on the enforcement of 
the laws, which provides the order essential to our society. Tort 
law at the state level is far more developed, and has evolved to 
take both of these factors into account. For that reason, a 
comparison to state actors seems to be an appropriate solution. 
That being said, any approach to assessing liability in this 
context—and the approach offered here is no exception—will still 
present serious difficulties because of the policy concerns that 
arise when balancing individual interests with societal interests. 
Those difficulties will be compounded as the roles and methods of 
law enforcement continue to evolve. However, it is important for 
any solution to recognize that liability in the law enforcement 
context cannot be handled in the same generalized way that is 
used for other government functions. Until the FTCA is revised to 
recognize these concerns, there will be significant drawbacks to 
applying that statute to the conduct of law enforcement officers. 
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